Stephen Conklin v. Yvette Kane by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-8-2015 
Stephen Conklin v. Yvette Kane 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Stephen Conklin v. Yvette Kane" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1262. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1262 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PS-035        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4106 
___________ 
 
STEPHEN G. CONKLIN, 
                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
YVETTE KANE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-13-cv-03058) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 7, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 8, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Stephen G. Conklin appeals from the order of the District Court denying his  
motion for sanctions against Mark E. Morrison, who is an attorney with the United States  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
Attorney’s Office, and the Honorable Yvette Kane, who is a judge of the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  Morrison represented Judge Kane 
in connection with certain proceedings described herein.  We will affirm.  
I. 
 This appeal presents several technical procedural issues arising from the parties’ 
litigation of this case in both state and federal court.  Substantively, however, this case is 
about nothing.  Conklin has been a frequent litigant before Judge Kane.  In 2013, he filed 
suit against Judge Kane in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin 
County.  He did so by filing a praecipe for a writ of summons, which does not contain 
any allegations or causes of action.  The Dauphin County court ultimately entered a 
judgment of non pros against Conklin when he refused to file a complaint.  Conklin has 
never identified in either state or federal court any substantive claim against Judge Kane 
that he wishes to pursue. 
 Instead, he has chosen to litigate collateral procedural issues.  Judge Kane, 
represented by Morrison, initially removed Conklin’s writ of summons to federal court 
pursuant to the “federal officer” removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442.  The District Court 
remanded the matter to Dauphin County because, without Conklin having filed an actual 
complaint, it could not determine the nature of the action and thus could not determine 
whether the action satisfied the requirements for federal officer removal.  (M.D. Pa. Civ. 
No. 1-13-cv-01531.)  On remand, Morrison filed on Judge Kane’s behalf a praecipe for a 
rule to file a complaint.  The rule to file a complaint subjected Conklin to a judgment of 
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non pros if he failed to file a state-court complaint against Judge Kane.  See Pa. R. Civ. P. 
1037(a).   
 Conklin did not file a state-court complaint against Judge Kane.  Instead, he 
responded to these developments in two other ways.  First, he filed a counseled federal 
complaint against Judge Kane alleging that her removal of the Dauphin County action 
violated his unspecified civil rights.  The District Court dismissed that complaint, and we 
affirmed.  See Conklin v. Kane, 610 F. App’x 98, 100 (3d Cir. 2015).   
 Second, Conklin filed a motion in the Dauphin County action for sanctions against 
Morrison and Judge Kane, which is the motion at issue here.  Conklin based that motion 
too in part on the removal of his writ of summons.  Conklin also asserted that (1) 
Morrison and the United States Attorney’s Office were not authorized under federal law 
to represent Judge Kane and (2)  Morrison failed to serve Conklin with the rule to file a 
complaint.  Conklin’s request for relief included a request for punitive relief and an order 
barring Morrison from representing Judge Kane in the Dauphin County action.1 
 The Dauphin County court later scheduled a hearing on Conklin’s motion for 
sanctions.  Before the hearing date, Morrison removed the sanctions proceeding to federal 
court, once again relying on the federal officer removal statute.  Conklin then filed a  
motion to remand and later filed a motion to disqualify the District Judge.  Both Morrison  
                                              
1 Conklin also requested an order directing Morrison to serve him with the rule to file a 
complaint, but Judge Kane’s subsequent counsel served Conklin with a copy more than 
one month before the Dauphin County court’s ultimate entry of a judgment of non pros. 
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and Judge Kane opposed Conklin’s motion for sanctions.   
 By order entered September 5, 2014, the District Court denied Conklin’s motions 
for remand and disqualification, denied his motion for sanctions against Morrison, and 
dismissed his motion for sanctions against Judge Kane.2  The District Court also took 
note of intervening developments in state court.  Shortly after removal of this sanctions 
proceedings, the Dauphin County court entered its judgment of non pros against Conklin 
for his failure to file a complaint.  Conklin did not appeal that ruling.  Thus, as the 
District Court noted, it appears that the Dauphin County action is concluded.  Because the 
District Court had jurisdiction only over the ancillary sanctions proceeding and not the 
Dauphin County action as a whole, however, the court remanded “what, if anything, 
remains of Conklin’s state court action.”  Conklin appeals pro se.3 
                                              
2 The District Court dismissed Conklin’s motion for sanctions against Judge Kane 
because she was represented by Morrison and did not sign any of the allegedly 
sanctionable filings.  The District Court denied Conklin’s motion for sanctions against 
Morrison on the merits.  Conklin has raised no specific challenge to the District Court’s 
dismissal of his motion for sanctions as to Judge Kane.  Thus, our discussion will focus 
on Morrison. 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Article III of the United States 
Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1442 as discussed below.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Although the District Court remanded “what, if anything, remains” of 
this matter to state court, its decision is final because it finally resolves Conklin’s request 
for sanctions on the merits and there is nothing further left to be done in the District 
Court.  See Roxbury Condo. Ass’n v. Anthony S. Cupo Agency, 316 F.3d 224, 226 (3d 
Cir. 2003); Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortg. Invs., 951 
F.2d 1399, 1403-04 (3d Cir. 1991).  Conklin has not sought review of the District Court’s 
order remanding this matter to state court, so we do not further address that issue.  We 
review the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction de novo.  See Farina v. Nokia Inc., 
625 F.3d 97, 110 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s 
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II. 
 We will affirm primarily for the reasons explained by the District Court, but we 
will address three issues that Conklin raises on appeal.  Before we do, we begin with the 
District Court’s Article III jurisdiction.  Morrison removed the sanctions proceeding 
pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442.  The statute permits 
federal officers to remove ancillary proceedings so long as certain statutory requirements 
are met.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), (d)(1).  In addition to those statutory requirements, 
a federal officer may remove a proceeding under this statute only if he or she asserts a 
“colorable federal defense.”  Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989).  The assertion 
of a colorable federal defense confers Article III jurisdiction on the District Court.  See 
id. at 136. 
 Conklin has not argued that Morrison failed to assert a colorable federal defense 
for Article III purposes, and our review confirms that Morrison has.  Morrison argued, 
among other things, that sanctions were not warranted because his representation of 
Judge Kane was authorized by federal law.  See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15.  That colorable 
federal defense was sufficient to confer Article III jurisdiction on the District Court.  See, 
e.g., In re Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Def. 
Ass’n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 473 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that the Federal Community 
                                                                                                                                                  
denial of a motion for disqualification, see United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 717 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014), and its denial of sanctions, see In 
re Prosser, 777 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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Defender asserted a colorable federal defense by arguing that its representation of state-
court prisoners was authorized by federal law), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 15-491 & 
15-494 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2015). 
 For the first time on appeal, Conklin argues that the District Court nevertheless 
lacked jurisdiction under the doctrine of “derivative jurisdiction.”  This doctrine renders a 
District Court powerless to act in a proceeding removed from state court if the state court 
itself lacked jurisdiction over that proceeding.  See Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 
382, 389 (1939).  Congress has abrogated this doctrine for proceedings removed under 
the general removal statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f), but the doctrine still applies to 
proceedings removed under § 1442, see Rodas v. Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 615-16 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
 Conklin argues that the Dauphin County court, and thus the District Court, lacked 
jurisdiction over this sanctions proceeding.  According to Conklin, the Dauphin County 
court never reclaimed jurisdiction after the District Court remanded the writ of summons 
because the District Court did not send the Dauphin County court a “certified copy” of 
the remand order as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  See Agostini v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 729 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he mailing of a certified copy of the remand 
order to state court is the event that formally transfers jurisdiction from a district court 
within this Circuit to a state court”).  There is no dispute that the District Court actually 
mailed a copy of its remand order or that the Dauphin County court received it.  Conklin 
nevertheless argues that the remand was defective because, as appears to be the case, the 
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copy of the remand order was not “certified.”  If there were any merit to Conklin’s 
argument, then it presumably would mean that everything the Dauphin County court did 
following remand is a nullity and that the District Court should have certified its initial 
remand order and returned the parties to state court to start over from the beginning.   
 Conklin’s argument, however, lacks merit.  Although the copy of the remand order 
that the District Court mailed to the Dauphin County court does not appear to be certified, 
the District Court mailed that order along with a copy of its docket entries reflecting the 
entry of that order and the Dauphin County court received them.  (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1-
13-cv-01531, ECF Nos. 9 & 11-1 at 16-21.)  The Dauphin County court thereafter 
resumed exercising jurisdiction.  Conklin did not object to the Dauphin County court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction, and he instead affirmatively sought relief from that court by 
filing his motion for sanctions.  Thus, the District Court clearly remanded this matter to 
the Dauphin County court and both that court and the parties clearly understood that fact.  
Under these circumstances, the District Court’s mailing of its remand order and docket 
entries constitutes “sufficient compliance” with the certification requirement.  Johnson v. 
Estelle, 625 F.2d 75, 78 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).4 
                                              
4 We also note that Conklin has waived this argument.  Truly jurisdictional issues cannot 
be waived, but “[t]he doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, despite its perhaps improvident 
name, is best understood as a . . . defect in removal, . . . not an essential ingredient to 
federal subject matter jurisdiction.”  Rodas, 656 F.3d at 619.  Thus, Conklin waived this 
argument by raising it for the first time on appeal.  We nevertheless address its merits in 
order to alleviate any potential uncertainty regarding the validity of the proceedings that 
the Dauphin County court conducted following the District Court’s initial remand. 
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 Conklin also argues that the District Court’s order remanding the writ of summons  
is law of the case because the District Court’s determination that removal of the writ of  
summons was improper means that removal of the sanctions proceeding was improper as 
well.  Conklin is mistaken.  When the District Court remanded the writ of summons, it 
concluded merely that removal of the Dauphin County action was not (yet) appropriate 
because Conklin had raised no actual substantive claim against Judge Kane.  In the 
absence of any substantive claim, the District Court was unable to determine whether 
Judge Kane could assert a colorable federal defense to such a claim or whether the 
requirements of the federal officer removal statute were satisfied.   
 This sanctions proceeding is different.  Conklin’s motion for sanctions made 
specific allegations against Morrison, and Morrison raised at least one colorable federal 
defense to those allegations.  Those allegations also enabled the District Court to 
determine whether the sanctions proceeding satisfied the requirements of the federal 
officer removal statute.  The District Court determined that it did, and we agree for the 
reasons that the District Court adequately explained and as summarized in the margin.5 
                                              
5 A federal officer may remove a proceeding under § 1442 if the proceeding is against 
him or her for acts committed “under color” of a federal office.  28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).  
Morrison’s representation of Judge Kane in his official capacity as an attorney with the 
United States Attorney’s Office clearly satisfies that requirement.  Conklin argues that 
such representation was not authorized by federal law, but “whether a federal officer 
defendant has completely stepped outside of the boundaries of its office is for a federal 
court, not a state court, to answer.”  In re Commonwealth’s Motion, 790 F.3d at 472 
(citing, inter alia, Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969)).   
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 The final issue we address is Conklin’s argument that Morrison’s notice of 
removal was untimely.  Notices of removal are subject to a 30-day deadline.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(b).  A specific provision governs how this deadline applies when a 
proceeding that is removable under § 1442 involves “a judicial order for testimony or 
documents.”  28 U.S.C. § 1446(g).  The 30-day period to remove such proceedings runs 
from the date on which a person receives notice that “a judicial order for testimony or 
documents is sought or issued or sought to be enforced.”  Id.    
 The District Court determined that this sanctions proceeding involved a “judicial 
order for testimony” because Conklin requested, and the Dauphin County court 
scheduled, a hearing at which it appeared that Morrison’s testimony would be required.  
The District Court further concluded that Morrison’s notice was timely because he filed it 
within 30 days of the Dauphin County court’s order scheduling that hearing. 
 Conklin does not contest the manner in which the District Court applied this  
provision or the District Court’s calculation of the deadline.6   Instead, he argues that this 
provision does not apply in the first place because the Dauphin County court’s order 
                                              
6 Morrison filed his notice of removal more than 30 days after receiving notice of 
Conklin’s motion for sanctions but within 30 days of the Dauphin County court’s order 
scheduling a hearing on that motion.  The District Court concluded that § 1446(g) permits 
multiple events during a single proceeding to trigger the 30-day clock because the 30-day 
deadline runs from the date on which “a judicial order for testimony or documents is 
sought or issued or sought to be enforced.”  28 U.S.C. § 1446(g) (emphasis added).  The 
District Court further concluded that, although Morrison did not file his notice within 30 
days of when Conklin “sought” a judicial order for testimony in his motion for sanctions, 
Morrison filed it within 30 days of when the Dauphin County court “issued” such an  
order by scheduling a hearing.  Whether § 1446(b)’s 30-day clock can be triggered more 
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scheduling a hearing was not a “judicial order for testimony.”  The parties have not cited, 
and we have not located, any appellate authority addressing the meaning of this term or 
any other issue arising under § 1446(g).  Section 1446(g) applies to proceedings that are 
removable under § 1442, however, and removability under § 1442 must be broadly rather 
than narrowly construed.  See In re Commonwealth’s Motion, 790 F.3d at 467 (citing 
Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1262 (3d Cir. 1994)).  The District 
Court explained why the Dauphin County court’s order scheduling a hearing likely was 
the functional equivalent of an order requiring Morrison’s testimony and, under the 
specific circumstances presented here, we agree. 
 Conklin’s remaining arguments challenge the District Court’s denial of sanctions  
on the merits and the District Judge’s refusal to recuse himself.  We have reviewed those  
arguments, including the argument that Chief Judge McKee of this Court appointed the 
District Judge by designation in order to “fix” this case.  We conclude that these 
arguments lack merit either for the reasons adequately explained by the District Court or 
for reasons that do not require discussion.   
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
than once under § 1446(g) is a novel issue that it appears no Court of Appeals has 
addressed.  We need not address that issue because Conklin has not raised it on appeal 
and “[i]t is well settled that § 1446(b)’s thirty-day time limit for removal is a procedural 
provision, not a jurisdictional one.”  Farina, 625 F.3d at 114. 
